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G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew 
Adler’s Move Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Janet Moore 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At crossroads marked by what social scientists call “concentrated 
disadvantage,”1 poor people and people of color encounter crime and 
criminal justice systems disproportionately and in multiple roles.2 Accusers 
and victims, defendants and perpetrators, witnesses and bystanders—in high 
crime areas, a single individual often bears two, three, or more of these 
identities simultaneously.3  
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. JD/MA 
(Philosophy), Duke University; MA (Divinity), University of Chicago. E-mail: 
janet.moore@uc.edu. I thank Professor Robert Boruchowitz for inviting this contribution 
to the Symposium. I thank Professors Matthew Adler, Robin West, Sandra Sperino, Felix 
Chang, and Betsy Lenhart for helpful comments on prior drafts of this essay. Many of the 
assertions made in this essay rely on MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). All errors are my own. 
Copyright © 2012 by Janet Moore.  
1 Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories 
of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 378–79 (2005) (“[T]he strongest and 
most stable macro-level predictors of crime include racial heterogeneity . . . poverty,  
and family disruption—factors typically treated as indicators of ‘concentrated 
disadvantage.’”). 
2 See, e.g., ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT: BLACK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1–3 (2007), available at http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc.pdf. In 2005, nearly half of homicide victims and 
nearly 40 percent of robbery victims in the United States were black. Id. at 1–3, 5. 
Among crime victims, nearly 80 percent of African Americans and 70 percent of whites 
are victims of intraracial crime, with blacks more likely than whites to be victims of 
interracial crime. Id. at 5 & tbl. 5. 
3 See id. at 1–3, 5 & tbl. 5. 
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This essay highlights the role of the indigent criminal defendant. That 
role warrants heightened scrutiny given the widely acknowledged crisis in 
the provision of public defense services4 fifty years after the landmark right-
to-counsel ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 In light of that crisis, this essay 
explores the implications of Matthew Adler’s extraordinary book, Well-
Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis,6 for the 
struggle to improve the quality of public defense and to address resource 
disparities that drive (or, at minimum, are closely associated with) 
disproportionate contact with crime and criminal justice systems by low-
income people and people of color.  
 For several reasons, Professor Adler’s book is an important resource for 
academicians and activists who care about criminal justice issues generally, 
as well as for those concerned more specifically with the quality of public 
defense services. First, Adler provides an invaluable explanation and 
expansion of social welfare economic theory. In his framing, this expressly 
normative discipline resists the dominant economic paradigm’s cabining of 
well-being to the satisfaction of personal preference. Adler’s turn on social 
welfare economic theory is prioritarian: He focuses on the relative 
contribution of large-scale policy decisions to enhanced individual well-
being, with priority given to improving the lot of the less well-off. 
Significantly, Adler also acknowledges the need to account for the extent to 
which individuals shape their own opportunities and life histories. Personal 
 
4 See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 93–95 (2009), 
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf; AMY BACH, ORDINARY 
INJUSTICE 1328 (2009) (documenting system failures); Bruce A. Green, Criminal 
Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1178–
85 (2003) (same). 
5 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (establishing Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel 
for indigent defendants facing felony charges). 
6 MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). 
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responsibility, or free will, must be incorporated as a variable in his 
economic calculus. 
In addition, while the arguments in Well-Being and Fair Distribution are 
intricate, Adler presents them in patient, discursive detail. Therefore the 
curious reader—even one uninitiated in the mathematical language of 
economic theory that fills many pages and footnotes of Adler’s book—will 
find him an able guide and translator. Adler’s arguments also are 
interdisciplinary. Yet his command of the subject matter guarantees that a 
broad spectrum of readers—from the trained economist, moral philosopher, 
or legal theorist to the intellectually curious observer or social activist—will 
find much to intrigue and to interrogate. Finally, Well-Being and Fair 
Distribution is the hair of the dog—and should be gratefully received 
amidst the latest bleary-eyed hangover caused by excessive celebration of 
homo economicus and his relentless self-interest maximization.7 
Gideon’s fiftieth anniversary is a timely occasion to note Adler’s 
remarkable contribution to the scholarly literature, and to begin testing his 
theoretical arguments in the real-world context of public defense services. 
Gideon famously ensconced the indigent defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to appointed counsel in cases involving state-level felony charges.8 
But in considering the implications of Adler’s theory for public defense 
reform, it is important to recognize that Gideon shares a birthday with an 
overshadowed twin, Douglas v. California.9  
Instead of relying on the Sixth Amendment as in Gideon, the Douglas 
Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment require appointment of counsel on direct appeal in 
 
7 Cf. Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within 
Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 167–70 (1992) [hereinafter 
Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity] (discussing alternatives to homo economicus and 
individual self-interest maximization as models for human subjectivity). 
8 372 U.S. at 339. 
9 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
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states that offer direct appeal as of right.10 Thus, Gideon and Douglas are 
twin sons of different mothers. Just as well-being and fairness are tightly 
intertwined in Adler’s theory, substantive and procedural justice are bound 
up with inequality reduction in the development of right-to-counsel 
doctrine. 
This doctrinal history indicates that public defense can fit nicely within 
Adler’s focus on fair, responsibility-sensitive distribution of well-being. 
Defender services are idiosyncratic. They are a federal constitutional 
positive-right mandate. They require redistribution of resources to people 
who are by definition lower on any relevant scale of well-being.11 Yet 
indigent criminal defendants are seldom viewed as ranking among the 
“deserving poor.”12 To the contrary, with respect to Adler’s responsibility-
sensitive approach, empirical research indicates that 20 percent of jurors 
invert the due process presumption of innocence; as representatives of their 
communities, these jurors presume instead that criminal defendants did 
something bad to deserve being caught up in the system.13 
 
10 Id. at 355–56. 
11 Qualifying individuals by definition cannot afford to retain counsel. See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.101.010 (2012). As Justice Ginsberg has noted, 70 percent of defendants 
represented by appointed counsel plead guilty, and 70 percent of those plea-convicted 
defendants serve time in jail or prison. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Nearly 70 percent of incarcerated inmates failed to graduate 
high school, are in the lowest two of five literacy levels, and are therefore unable, for 
example, to “use a bus schedule.” Id. Public defense cases also disproportionately involve 
defendants suffering from mental illness. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra 
note 4, at 7. 
12 See, e.g., Karen M. Tami, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a 
Language of the State, 122 YALE L. J. 314, 323–26, n.42 (2012) (discussing the 
construction of the “deserving poor” trope); Wendy A. Bach, Governance, 
Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 240, 248 (2010) 
(same). 
13 See Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the 
Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 247–49 (2006); see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. 
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Thus, public defense services satisfy Adler’s interest in fair, 
responsibility-sensitive distribution of well-being. They also fit well within 
his focus on large-scale policy matters. In 2007, expenditures on indigent 
defense totaled more than $830 million.14 Significantly, that sum accounts 
only for the minority of states (twenty-two) that handle funding on a 
statewide basis as opposed to on a county or municipal basis.15  
That magnitude of public expenditure easily meets Adler’s criterion for a 
large-scale policy arena. Moreover, his insights may be especially useful to 
proponents of public defense reform as a recent spate of cases expands the 
mandate for appointed counsel. For example, in Halbert v. Michigan,16 the 
Court invoked the equal protection analysis of Douglas to mandate 
appointed counsel for plea-sentenced defendants seeking first-tier 
discretionary appellate review. Even more recently, in Padilla v. 
Kentucky,17 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel requires attorneys to caution defendants when a plea offer 
implicates the collateral consequence of deportation. Notably, the Court 
imposed these expanded duties in the face of apparently intractable 
disparities in financial and other resources that simultaneously drive 
demand for and hinder the provision of quality public defense services.18  
 The exacerbating public defense crisis requires reform advocates to mine 
new resources for improving defender services. Part II contributes to that 
 
Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
291, 340–41 (discussing prosecutorial presumptions of defendants’ guilt). 
14 LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER PROGRAMS 2007 4 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub 
/pdf/spdp07.pdf.  
15 Id.  
16 545 U.S. 605, 610–11 (2005). 
17 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
18  See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; see infra Part IV.B; see also Janet 
Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (discussing solutions for the democracy deficit at the intersection of 
crime, race, and poverty) [hereinafter Moore, Democracy Enhancement]. 
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effort by investigating Adler’s innovative work at the intersection of law, 
moral philosophy, and economic theory. It is impossible to plumb the 
depths of Well-Being and Fair Distribution in these few pages. I seek 
instead to identify key steps in Adler’s analysis and to provoke interest 
among scholars and practitioners in his formula for moral decision-making 
in the context of large-scale policy matters. 
But Adler acknowledges a number of challenging questions that are set 
aside for future elaboration. He also sidesteps raging debates over some of 
the first principles or working assumptions upon which his arguments rest.19 
Part III touches on some of these questions and challenges.  
Part IV responds to Adler’s more vociferous naysayers by using some of 
his key concepts to analyze the arrested development of the indigent 
defendant’s right to appointed counsel. This Part queries whether a moral 
decision-making process akin to Adler’s continuous prioritarian social 
welfare function may have informed the development of right-to-counsel 
doctrine. The brief discussion here anticipates future elaboration of this 
analysis and argument. An expanded inquiry should assess, for example, 
any role that Adler’s form of inequality-averse decision-making has played 
in the genesis of exemplary public defense systems and other attempts to 
redress the systemic disparities that are linked with the causes and 
consequences of crime. 
This essay concludes by calling for refinement of Adler’s methodology to 
prioritize democracy enhancement at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty. Movement beyond reform efforts driven by elites and toward a 
regime in which low income people and people of color are empowered to 
ask their own criminal justice policy questions, to form their own coalitions, 
and to advocate for their own solutions remains, at this writing, an elusive 
 
19 See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 6, at xiii (“[T]his book works within welfarism, rather 
than engaging ongoing debates between welfarists and non-welfarists.”). 
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hope.20 It is my own hope that broader awareness of Adler’s excellent work 
will help to transform that possibility into a reality. 
II. INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE MOVE BEYOND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
This Part summarizes Adler’s purpose in writing Well-Being and Fair 
Distribution and identifies key concepts in his argument. The prioritarian 
focus on improving the lot of the less well-off is critical to his theory’s 
relevance in the real-world struggle for public defense reform. Unpacking 
that connection requires close attention to Adler’s integration of moral 
philosophy and economic analysis. Part II.A discusses Adler’s stance on 
several overarching or “metaethical” controversies that necessarily 
influence the elucidation of any moral decision-making procedure, 
including his own. Part II.B tracks Adler’s struggle to capture the crucial, 
yet elusive meaning of “well-being.” Part II.C identifies economic 
principles that are pivotal to Adler’s theory, and traces their role in his 
argument. 
A. Practical Purpose and First Premises 
Professor Adler’s goal in Well-Being and Fair Distribution is as precise 
as his prose. Using rigorous deductive analysis, he designs a procedure for 
morally evaluating large-scale policy choices. The procedure ranks decision 
outcomes according to their relative enhancement of individual well-being, 
with priority given to improving the lot of the less well-off.21 Adler’s intent 
is practical. He wants policymakers to apply his decision-making procedure 
 
20 Cf. Bach, supra note 12, at 266–69 (critiquing “nonexistent” or “ineffective” 
participation by affected communities in construction and oversight of poverty-reduction 
programs). 
21 ADLER, supra note 6, at 78. 
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within real-world constraints of limited knowledge, uncertain and changing 
externalities, and the absence of anything like a free lunch. 
Adler begins by laying out four initial premises. Three of these premises 
are substantive and one is procedural. For many readers, Adler’s first 
premise will be the most controversial. His moral universe is person-
centered. Animals and environmental concerns are excluded, except as 
hypothetically relevant to the pursuit of human well-being.  
Adler cites Kant, Rawls, Scanlon, and “[a]ll of welfare economics” to 
support his anthropocentric starting point.22 In this view, only humans have 
the capacity to establish and follow moral norms—those “ought” principles 
for guiding conduct that apply fairly to all individuals. For Adler, this 
unique capacity for moral reasoning makes human beings the only entities 
to whom the concept of fair distribution can properly apply. 
Adler claims agnosticism regarding metaethical controversies. But his 
person-centered starting premises are deeply rooted in the neoKantian 
tradition.  That methodology celebrates the concept of autonomy, or moral 
self-rule via the individual’s rational generation and acceptance of binding 
normative principles.23 Additional evidence of a neoKantian influence 
includes Adler’s arguments that the “separateness of persons”24 and the 
reification of each individual human being as “a distinct source of moral 
concerns” justify the goal of distributing well-being fairly.25 Also salient is 
 
22 Id. at 5, 8–9 nn.12–16. 
23  See, e.g., ANDREWS REATH, AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 137–38 (2006).   
24 ADLER, supra note 6, at 314–17  & n.15 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
10–15 (1999)); id. at 439–42 & n.59 (citing THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND 
PARTIALITY 69 (1995)); see also Ian Ward, Another Look at the New Rawls, 24 ANGLO-
AM. L. REV. 104, 120–21 (1995) (discussing Rawls in the context of neoKantianism). 
25 ADLER, supra note 6, at 29. 
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his adoption of the contested proposition that personal identity is continuous 
throughout an individual’s lifetime.26 
Adler’s insistence on the unique, nonfungible moral significance of each 
individual’s personhood fits well with core concerns animating right-to-
counsel doctrine, including the “peculiarly sacred” vindication of individual 
liberty in the face of concentrated government power.27 There is similar 
resonance between the constitutional interests in fairness and equal 
treatment that underpin right-to-counsel doctrine and Adler’s second, 
closely related criterion for moral decision-making: impartiality. This 
second criterion might be captured more precisely as a demand for the 
exercise of moral imagination.28 By definition, moral norms cannot be of 
wholly idiosyncratic origin or application. More specifically, the ranking of 
outcomes in Adler’s moral decision-making procedure must itself function 
impartially—that is, equally across persons—as to the interests of the 
individuals whose well-being the procedure is designed to enhance. 
But these initial premises beg a critical question: How precisely are 
binding moral norms to be generated? Adler answers this procedural 
question by invoking the concept of reflective equilibrium. He cites the 
imprimatur of “the vast majority of contemporary moral philosophers” for 
this methodological choice.29 Reflective equilibrium is the deliberative 
 
26 Id. at 406, 409–14; see also Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 159–
62, 186–89 (discussing contested meanings of subjectivity). But see ADLER, supra note 6, 
at 269–70 n.47 (probing boundaries of essential properties of personhood). 
27 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 
370, 37475 (1892)).  
28 Compare Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 188–89 (arguing for 
“imaginative participation in another’s life-world”), with ADLER, supra note 6, at 31 
(“[A] willingness to consider choice from a broader perspective that encompasses other 
persons’ interests, relationships, projects and attachments, not just the agent’s own, is the 
hallmark of any variant of moral thinking.”). 
29 ADLER, supra note 6, at 21; cf. Ward, supra note 24, at 104, 120–21 (discussing 
Kant’s explication of the sensus communis and citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE 
OF JUDGMENT 150–54 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990)). 
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process through which participants test their moral intuitions and principles 
against competing principles and against concrete facts. Participants revise 
intuitions and principles that are incommensurate either with more attractive 
competing intuitions and principles or with the obstinacy of real-world facts 
in particular cases. 
Adler readily concedes that reflective equilibrium is methodologically 
distinct from (if not alien to) the deductive logic and mathematical proofs 
that form the core of much economic theory. This is so whether or not 
moral deliberation is undertaken by individuals abstracted from the concrete 
particulars of existence, like the crowd separated from themselves and each 
other by the Rawlsian veil.30 But as Adler demonstrates, formal 
mathematical proofs yield many logically possible formulae for making 
large-scale moral decisions to enhance human well-being.  He concludes 
that to evaluate those competing alternative decision structures, “[t]here 
really is no other game in town” than the “fuzzier and more contestable” 
process of reflective equilibrium.31 
Adler’s third substantive criterion for a moral decision-making 
procedure, in addition to person-centeredness and impartiality, is 
transcendence from social norms or conventions. Moral judgment is 
necessarily critical. It distinguishes better from worse. Adler concludes 
from these observations that moral judgment necessarily stands apart from 
that which is judged and therefore cannot be merely coextensive with 
existing social practices, including law.  
The contestable notion of moral judgment’s detachment from social 
practice is less pivotal to Adler’s reasoning than his unobjectionable 
premise that critical moral judgment can motivate movement from the 
descriptive is to a normative ought. As discussed above, Adler’s ought is 
 
30  See RAWLS, supra note 24, at 136–38 (discussing the hypothetical veil of ignorance 
behind which individuals generate principles of justice). 
31 ADLER, supra note 6, at 22. 
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consequentialist: He focuses on the outcomes of decision-making by large-
scale policymakers, and offers a framework for ranking outcomes to favor 
the enhancement of individual human well-being. As was also previously 
noted, Adler’s ought is prioritarian: His methodology gives preference to 
choices that improve the lot of the less well-off. Each of these emphases 
resonates with core commitments of public defense reformers.   
But Adler’s insistence that this type of decision-making is moral—and 
therefore transcends social norms, including law—problematizes any leap 
to codify his decision-making process as a procedural mandate. Importantly, 
he does not draw the inverse conclusion.  He does not deny that prioritarian 
moral decision-making can produce legal mandates. Part IV begins 
exploring the evidence that the federal constitutional right to appointed 
counsel emerged through just such a process, that is, a process of reflective 
equilibrium in a person-centered framework emphasizing impartiality and 
fairness through inequality reduction and improvement of the lot of the less 
well-off. 
B. Platitudes and the Meaning of “Well-Being”  
Simply by establishing the foregoing initial premises for his more 
detailed arguments, Adler supplies readers previously innocent of economic 
theory’s complex variations with a series of refreshing “Aha!” moments. As 
he correctly observes, some readers will be surprised to learn that cost-
benefit analysis “is a kind of moral decision procedure.”32 But he is too 
modest here. For some, the existence of social welfare economics as a 
discipline will be news. Still others will wonder at the confidence of his 
proclamation, pace Twain, that reports of this discipline’s demise have been 
greatly exaggerated.33 
 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 Id. at 89; cf. JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 562:13 (17th ed., 
2002) (quoting a June 1, 1897, note from Mark Twain to a reporter for the N.Y. JOURNAL 
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Adler’s book is important because he makes these discoveries possible 
(or, at minimum, offers elegant arguments that can inspire critical 
reflection) for readers whose views of economic theory are shaped primarily 
by Chicago-school free market and libertarian analyses. Well-Being and 
Fair Distribution offers food for thought to those who, with Alan 
Greenspan, were “shocked” by the most recent evidence that their “model 
[for] . . . the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works” 
contained “a flaw” despite decades of “very considerable evidence” that the 
model worked “exceptionally well.”34 The model’s unanticipated “flaw” 
was the unreliability of self-interest as the lodestar of a healthy economy. 
Adler’s book also offers much for anyone who was shocked that Greenspan 
was shocked.35 
An economic theory that shifts the analysis from gross satisfaction of 
personal preference to inequality reduction can be a powerful tool for public 
defense reform advocates. Adler lays out the core components of that new 
framework as follows. First, he clearly marks the points at which he 
declines to engage in ongoing and often fierce debates among economists 
and among moral philosophers. For example, he sidelines the dispute 
 
stating, “[t]he report of my death was an exaggeration.”). But see, e.g., Daniel M. 
Hausman, Review, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 28 
ECON. & PHIL 435, 436 (2012) (“Despite the genius with which the approach is 
developed, the approach is, I believe, hopeless; and the very genius with which it is 
developed establishes this conclusion.”), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action 
/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=8764394&jid=EAP&volumeId=28&issueId=03&aid=8764
392&newWindow=Y; Mark Sagoff, Review, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., Dec. 4, 2012 (describing Adler’s book 
as “so brilliant it does not just bang another nail in the coffin of welfare economics. It is 
the coffin itself.”), available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36051-well-being-and-fair-
distribution-beyond-cost-benefit-analysis. 
34 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Governmental Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008) (statement of Dr. 
Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank) (transcript available at 
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081023100438.pdf). 
35 See, e.g., Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 167–70. 
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between advocates and opponents of social welfare economics. Instead, he 
“works within welfarism”36 and strives to make the rigor and 
comprehensiveness of his argument structure attractive to adherents and 
skeptics alike. He also situates his arguments within a consequentialist 
moral philosophical tradition—that is, one focused on production of good 
outcomes, with “goodness” encompassing considerations of fair 
distribution—while giving a brief nod to critiques of that tradition.37 
As noted above, metaethical disputes comprise one topic upon which 
Adler claims agnosticism. He tries to avoid staking any claims on this 
“treacherous ground.”38 Take the debate over the ontological status of moral 
facts or assertions. As Adler explains, some insist that moral assertions, 
such as “Truth-telling is good,” lack any independent, external referent, and 
simply reveal information about the speaker’s preference, plan, or emotion. 
Others view moral facts as products of a hypothetical setting in which the 
preferences of fully rational, informed, and impartial participants converge. 
Still others perceive moral facts as entities existing independent of human 
intervention. In this view, a moral assertion can be as true or false as the 
statement, “The Earth revolves around the Sun.” 
Adler leans toward the intermediate stance (the convergent preference 
model) in defining “well-being.” The meaning of the term “well-being” 
obviously is critical to his analysis. But he views resolution of the 
underlying dispute about the true nature of moral facts as unnecessary to 
acceptance of his arguments by members of opposing philosophical camps. 
Instead, he invites readers of any persuasion to be persuaded by the 
elegance of his logic. 
Adler also acknowledges diversity of opinion on the precise definition of 
well-being. Indeed, his systematic engagement with this key contested issue 
 
36 ADLER, supra note 6, at xviii. 
37 Id. at 24–32. 
38 Id. at 19. 
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in moral philosophy is one of the joys of Well-Being and Fair Distribution. 
That engagement includes the poignant observation that “reaching a point 
of reflective equilibrium with respect to the nature of well-being is 
difficult.”39 In the end, by leaning toward the convergent-preference model 
for defining well-being, Adler intends to accommodate varying accounts. 
As he relates, some philosophers (and many economists) champion a 
liberal definition of well-being in terms of the satisfaction of individual 
preferences or desires. Others assess the quality of internal mental states. 
From the Benthamite-utilitarian perspective, for example, the relevant 
question is whether a particular choice will increase pleasure or pain.40 Still 
others identify objective goods that constitute human well-being. 
Philosophers’ checklists of objective goods range from life and health, 
through the existence of other species and play, to interpersonal 
relationships and aesthetic sensibilities.41 
From this “blooming, buzzing confusion,”42 Adler teases out three basic 
principles (or “platitudes”)43 incorporated into any meaningful conception 
of well-being. First, the concept of well-being “has critical force. In other 
words, an individual can be mistaken about his own well-being.”44 That 
principle would indeed be a platitude to the parent of any teenager, and 
Adler views the majority of philosophers as accepting it. He includes 
philosophers whose definition of well-being lies at the liberal, preference-
satisfaction end of the spectrum. But he concedes that many economists 
would reject the idea out of skepticism toward any normative evaluation of 
others’ goals and preferences. 
 
39 Id. at 170. 
40 Id. at 162–63. 
41 Id. at 165–69. 
42 WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 462 (Frederick H. Burkhardt et 
al. eds., 1981). 
43 ADLER, supra note 6, at 170. 
44 Id. 
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Second, the concept of well-being must have “motivational force.”45 
Well-being is a good outcome for an individual subject. As between two 
outcomes, if one is better and one is worse the subject would be motivated 
to choose the former. But echoing his earlier lament about the difficulty of 
defining well-being, Adler confesses that “what exactly it means for an 
outcome to be better for an individual is elusive.”46 
Instead he identifies a third principle or platitude underlying the concept 
of well-being. The concept must involve more immediate than remote 
alternative outcomes. An outcome’s immediacy and remoteness could 
relate, for example, to time, geography, or intensity of personal relationship. 
The connection between an influence, choice, or outcome and an 
individual’s well-being attenuates asymptotically as the consequence 
becomes less immediate (or more remote).47 
 Ultimately, as noted above, Adler relies on an abstract conceptual 
methodology to generate a definition of well-being. Well-being, for his 
purposes, is defined by the convergent preferences of fully rational, 
informed, and impartial participants striving together toward reflective 
equilibrium. He modifies that open-ended striving by giving the participants 
a defined subject for deliberation: the extended life-history.48 This concept 
is critical for Adler’s move beyond cost-benefit analysis or other economic 
applications that resist the interpersonal comparisons necessary to assessing 
fair distribution of well-being and prioritization of the interests of the less 
well-off. 
 
 
 
45 Id. at 173. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 174–78. Adler admits that the issue of remoteness in the definition of well-being 
has been of far more concern to philosophers than economists. Id. at 178. 
48 Id. at 49, 102, 155–56. 
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C. Pareto and Pigou-Dalton  
It is worth reiterating here that Adler focuses on social welfare economics 
as a source for making moral decisions about large-scale policy choices. 
Because he works within welfarism, his decision-making model aims at 
maximizing human well-being. Yet he expressly rejects utilitarianism’s 
definition of the “good” as an aggregation of satisfied preferences. Instead, 
he wants a decision-making model that is sensitive to fair distribution of 
well-being. Fairness is in turn a criterion for his model because he views 
each individual as a separate, unique focus of moral concern. Finally, 
fairness, in Adler’s framework, prioritizes outcomes that improve well-
being for the less well-off.  
These preliminary commitments require a mechanism for interpersonal, 
as opposed to merely intrapersonal, comparisons of individual well-being. 
Adler offers the concept of the life-history as a foundation for making those 
interpersonal comparisons. He explains the crucial concept of life-history as 
follows. 
For each individual i or j in the universe of individuals deliberating over 
the definition and pursuit of well-being, there can be posited a mathematical 
expression of the relationship between i and the outcome of his or her entire 
life.49 As noted above, Adler presumes that the individual personal identities 
of i and j remain separate, constant and nonfungible throughout the course 
of i’s and j’s respective lives.50 The universe of possible entire outcomes for 
i and j can be denoted as containing x, y, and z, where these outcomes 
represent descriptions of all possible past, present, and future histories.51 A 
life-history is the pairing of one individual from the universe of individuals 
with one outcome from the universe of possible outcomes. Pairings would 
 
49 Id. at 49–50. 
50  See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
51 ADLER, supra note 6, at 49–50. 
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be expressed, for example, as i’s life in x outcome (x; i) and j’s life in 
outcome y (y; j).52 
 It is now possible to begin ranking life-histories. Here Adler introduces 
readers unacquainted with economic theory to some of the discipline’s basic 
axioms. These include the Pareto and Pigou-Dalton principles. A decision-
making system that strives to maximize human well-being can satisfy the 
Pareto-indifference principle if it is possible to compare two different life-
histories—that is, two different entire outcomes for the same person [(x; i) 
and (y; i)] and identify outcomes in which i is equally well-off.53 That 
decision-making procedure reveals that x and y have the same moral worth, 
and ranks those outcomes equally.54 
But a decision-making system also must be able to evaluate outcomes in 
terms of the strong and weak Pareto principles.55 The former tests for 
outcomes such that at least one individual is better off in outcome x than in 
outcome y, and for everyone else, x and y are at least equally good. In that 
setting, x is morally better than y.56 Weak Pareto provides another method 
for ranking outcomes: If each participant is better off in outcome x than in 
outcome y, then x beats y in terms of moral worth.57 
A problem arises because some outcomes are Pareto-noncomparable. For 
example, it may be the case that i’s well-being is better in x than in y, but j’s 
well-being is better in y than in x [(x; i) > (y; i) but (x; j) < (y; j)].58 Or 
outcome x could be better for the well-being of a few people than is 
outcome y, while x is worse for the well-being of more people than is 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 52–56.  
54 Id. at 52–55. 
55 Id. at 53–55. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 55–56. 
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outcome y [(x; i, j, k) > (y; i, j, k) but (x; l, m, n . . . z) < (y; l, m, n . . . z)].59 
Adler sets himself the task of providing a mechanism to rank the moral 
value of these tougher, Pareto-noncomparable outcomes. 
Adler voices some skepticism about the ability systematically to compare 
well-being across different individuals, particularly using the deductive 
logic of economic theory. He asks, 
[W]hat is the most attractive account of well-being? Why believe 
that it allows for interpersonal comparisons? What would such 
comparisons consist of? And even if interpersonal comparisons are 
possible, how do we construct numerical utilities that represent the 
well-being ranking of life-histories or the well-being differences 
between life-histories?60 
 Adler answers this question in part through the concept of extended 
preferences. These are constructed as participants seek reflective 
equilibrium regarding the fair distribution of well-being by ranking the 
universe of life-histories according to both preference (their own self-
interested preference as well as other-interested preferences) and probability 
(the likelihood that a given life-history will come to fruition).61 Within the 
universe of these ranked life-histories, it is then possible to evaluate the 
differences between various pairs of life-histories and make moral 
judgments about better and worse outcomes across persons. 
Enter the Pigou-Dalton principle. This is a mechanism for prioritizing the 
reduction of inequality. In other words, a moral decision-making procedure 
that maximizes individual well-being also satisfies Pigou-Dalton “if it gives 
greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals.”62 In 
Adler’s schematic, the principle has four premises and a conclusion. If (1) 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 155. 
61 Id. at 201–02. 
62 Id. at 78. 
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Jamila’s well-being is greater than Isaac’s in outcome y and greater than or 
equal to Isaac’s in outcome x; (2) Isaac’s well-being is greater in x than in y, 
but the reverse holds true for Jamila; (3) the differences between Jamila’s 
well-being in x and y and Isaac’s well-being in x and y are equal; and (4) no 
one else is affected by the difference between x and y, then x is morally 
better than y. 63 
In terms of ranked life histories, the premises would look like this:64 
(1) (y; j) > (y; i) and (x; j) > (x; i) 
(2) (x; i) > (y; i) and (y; j) > (x; j) 
(3) [(y; j) - (x; j)] = [(x; i) - (y; i)] 
(4) (x; k, l, m . . . z) = (y; k, l, m . . . z) 
Another way to state premises (1) and (2) is: 
(y; j) > (x; j) > (x; i) > (y; i) 
Put that way, it is easy to see that Jamila’s well-being is greater than Isaac’s 
in y and greater than or equal to Isaac’s in x. Conversely, Isaac is worse off 
in y and at least as well off as Jamila in x. Because the Pigou-Dalton 
principle prioritizes reduction of inequality, as long as the interpersonal 
well-being differences between Jamila and Isaac are equal as between life-
histories in x or y, it is morally better to improve Isaac’s well-being.65 
Adler captures the moral impetus favoring improvement in the well-being 
of the less well-off in terms of a graphically illustrated mathematical 
equation.66 The equation is sufficiently complicated that it will not be 
reproduced here. But the x:y-axis graph is readily imagined. A curved line 
begins at (0,0) and ascends steadily in an arc that is concave with respect to 
 
63 See id. at 339. 
64 See id. at 340. 
65 See id. at 79. 
66 Id. at 72, 79, 553. 
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the x-axis. Overall utility increases along the x-axis. Thus, an individual 
with more well-being (Jamila) would be to the right at point j from Isaac, 
who would be at some lesser well-being point i closer to (0,0).67 A “g 
function” transforms utility along the y-axis. Crucially, that transformation 
decreases inequality, but in such a way that Jamila’s loss in well-being 
would never exceed Isaac’s gain.68 
Thus, Adler’s g-function drives change in a particular direction—a 
continuous prioritarian direction that emphasizes improvement in well-
being for the less well-off. He notes that purely utilitarian decision-making 
processes, like cost-benefit analysis, cannot satisfy Pigou-Dalton’s demand 
for sensitivity to fair distribution of well-being across persons.69 In Adler’s 
calculus, the inequality-aversion factor (denoted as ɤ) would prioritize 
higher levels of improvement for the less well-off as inequality increases. 
At maximum levels of inequality, ɤ would asymptotically approach 
“absolute priority [for] worse-off individuals.”70 Conversely, ɤ would yield 
a more utilitarian prioritization of collective well-being as inequality 
drops.71 
D. Summing Up 
Adler’s arguments warrant attention because they offer a new way to 
promote decision-making in large-scale policy settings aimed at improving 
the lot of the less well-off. Those settings include the struggle to improve 
public defense services. Adler’s neoKantian insistence on the nonfungible 
value of each person resonates with constitutional interests in securing 
 
67 See id. at 79. 
68 See id. at 72, 79 (describing this transformed utility function, g(u), as “strictly 
increasing and strictly concave”); id. at 79 (showing that the g function continually 
decreases inequality with priority of change favoring the less well-off.) 
69 Id. at 78. 
70 Id. at 383–87, 553. 
71 Id. at 387. 
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liberty and equal, fair treatment, particularly in confrontations between the 
individual and concentrated government power. Adler’s application of 
economic theory’s deductive logic opens the way toward the interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being that can support an inequality-averse “g 
function” that is attentive to fair, responsibility-sensitive distribution. 
To be clear, this essay’s brief introduction to some key concepts and 
arguments in Well-Being and Fair Distribution cannot do justice to Adler’s 
detailed discussion. Nor will this essay present a thoroughgoing critique of 
the book’s complex interdisciplinary arguments. Adler acknowledges a 
number of challenging questions that are set aside for future elaboration. He 
also sidesteps fierce debates over some of his first principles and working 
assumptions. Part III touches on some of those unresolved issues, which 
will influence the application of Adler’s theory in real-world contexts such 
as public defense reform. 
III. PROBLEMS, PUZZLES, AND PROVING GROUNDS 
Adler’s arguments face heavy fire from scholars who are averse to the 
possibilities that well-being could be subject to interpersonal comparison or 
that the well-being of one may be sacrificed to improve the lot of others on 
any terms properly denominated as “moral.”72 With respect to the first 
concern, classically liberal angst spikes with any trenching on the 
autonomous individual’s freedom to choose his or her ends.73 But it takes a 
radical skeptic to dismiss even the abstract possibility of discovering 
common ground through deliberative processes. (That’s what democracy is 
supposed to look like.) And at least some readers will find Adler’s novel 
challenge to the hegemony of classical liberalism’s autonomous self-
 
72 See, e.g., Sagoff, supra note 33, (“[w]arn[ing] against the fatal conceit” of 
“[a]pparatchiks of a Welfarist Party . . . enforc[ing] their own views of what counts as an 
informed, fully rational, extended preference.”). 
73 See id. 
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interest-maximizer74 to be a chief source of interest in a complex and 
challenging set of arguments. 
The second concern sparks greater interest. Daniel Hausman is a leading 
scholar in the philosophy of economics who faults Adler for the “startling” 
claim that “concerns about fairness exhaust morality.”75 Hausman also 
alleges that Adler “explicitly defends” the premise that “small benefits to 
enough well-off individuals can compensate for harms to very badly off 
individuals.”76 
Both criticisms seem overstated. As noted in Part II, Adler strives 
through his anthropocentric insistence on the primacy and separateness of 
persons to champion the indissoluble and non-fungible moral worth of each 
individual human being.77 It is here that his neoKantian approach diverges 
quite sharply from utilitarianism’s bald willingness to sacrifice the interests 
of one to the collective good of the many. 
Adler does adopt a rebuttable assumption that fairness is a sufficient 
moral criterion within his own welfarist framework. He cites Rawls as a 
comrade-in-arms.78 Yet he also justifies his working assumption by 
reiterating the expansive definition and role of fairness within his theory. 
For Adler, fairness 
provides an overarching structure for determining the normative 
significance of facts about human well-being. All of the various 
aspects of an individual’s welfare determine the valence of her 
claim between a given pair of outcomes.79 
 
74 See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
75 Hausman, supra note 33, at 438. 
76 Id. at 441. 
77 See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
78 See ADLER, supra note 6, at 338–39 & n.54 (discussing RAWLS, supra note 24, at 15, 
93–98). 
79 Id. at 338.  
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In other words, the concept of fairness is tightly linked with the “all-
things-considered” reflective equilibrium process that generates definitions 
of well-being, rankings of life-histories, and the corresponding interpersonal 
moral claims of individuals to increased well-being.80 This genesis of 
fairness—a kind of Immaculate Conception—may inspire awe (or 
incredulity). But given this genesis, Adler’s claim for the sufficiency of 
fairness as a moral criterion within his social welfare framework is, perhaps 
ironically, considerably more modest than Hausman suggests. 
Nor does Adler champion a “Numbers Win” subordination of a worse-off 
individual’s interests to the collective improvement of the better-off. To the 
contrary, in his calculus the g-function prioritizes increased well-being for 
the less well-off. Adler argues that despite possessing the “Numbers Win” 
feature, a continuous prioritarian social welfare decision-making structure is 
optimal for large-scale policy matters.81 
Adler further notes that many find “Numbers Win” to be an 
“unattractive” feature of continuous prioritarian social welfare decision-
making structures.82 He describes “Numbers Win” as “very troubling,”83 
“unfortunate,”84 and a “deficit” for this type of decision-making 
procedure.85 He attempts, perhaps unpersuasively, to ameliorate the effects 
of the “Numbers Win” feature with a modifier. Where decreases in well-
being for an individual are “sufficiently small,” he proposes that some 
fraction of that loss—“perhaps a very small fraction”—should be capable of 
being “trumped by benefits to a sufficiently large number of people.”86 
 
80 See id. at 201–02, 337 nn.52–53. 
81 Id. at 360. 
82 Id. at 358. 
83 Id. at 360. 
84 Id. & n.87. 
85 Id. at 360. 
86 Id. at 377–78. 
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Although future scholarship will doubtless develop more fully the extant 
and potential critiques of Well-Being and Fair Distribution, several 
noteworthy questions arise in the context of criminal justice policy reform 
and in the more specific setting of public defense services. One pressing 
item on Adler’s own “to-do” list is a more complete account of the meaning 
and role of individual responsibility in a continuous prioritarian moral 
decision-making procedure.87 How can systems appropriately “distinguish 
between individuals who are responsible for being badly off and those who 
are badly off through no fault of their own”?88 
The closing pages of Well-Being and Fair Distribution offer several 
angles from which to tackle that important task. As Adler notes, 
determining aspects of a life-history for which individuals can and should 
be held accountable “implicat[es] one of the deepest philosophical 
puzzles—free will.”89 Again, the high salience of these issues in the 
criminal justice setting is indisputable. Criminal law and procedure 
constitute a proving ground in theoretical and practical struggle over the 
scope and meaning of personal responsibility. In delineating the appropriate 
boundaries of regulatory authority between individual, community, and the 
concentrated power of government, the discipline perpetually teeters over 
the divide between deontology and teleology, retributivism and 
deterrence.90 
Thus, criminal justice issues provide an excellent context within which to 
test and refine Adler’s arguments, particularly in elaborating the role of free 
will as compared to conditioned choice or luck. On this point, interesting 
subjects for future analysis include the definition and functionality of  
 
87 Id. at 37–38. 
88 Id. at 579. 
89 Id. at 584. 
90 This point is commonly driven home in the opening pages of first-year criminal law 
casebooks. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1–3, 30–48 (2012). 
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incentives. Also important are debates over the existence and effect of 
implicit racial or ethnic bias,91 and the extent to which structural inequalities 
have racially invariant consequences.92 
At a more fundamental level, the architecture of the reflective 
equilibrium process is subject to challenge.  Recall that Adler aims to bridge 
the gap between theory and practice. He seeks to augment cost-benefit 
analysis as an applied methodology for governing large-scale policy choices 
with a continuous prioritarian social welfare process that is sensitive to 
responsibility—that is, the exercise of individual free will. In the real world, 
what mechanisms can promote equal participation by the less well-off in 
constructing consensus over the definition of well-being? Are there any 
assurances that consensus will reflect more than the extended preferences of 
elites? 
Adler’s move from theory to practice requires simplification of possible 
life-history outcome and utility sets “so that individuals and social planners 
 
91 See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Supply Side or Discrimination? Assessing the Role of 
Unconscious Bias, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 887–902 (2011) (surveying literature and 
challenging empirical support for unconscious bias as a causal factor capable of objective 
proof or redress through law). But see, e.g., State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip 
op. at 2–4, 19–28 (Cumberland Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (vacating three 
defendants’ death sentences based on finding of prosecutors’ intentional and implicit 
racial bias in capital jury selection), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/racial-
justice/Golphin-et-al-RJA-Order.pdf. The state legislature subsequently repealed the 
Racial Justice Act that made these findings possible. See Moore, Democracy 
Enhancement, supra note 18 (discussing Act’s history, implementation, and repeal; 
citing, inter alia, Act of June 13, 2013, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 154, § 5(a-d), repealing 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010-2012 (2012). 
92 Compare, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Lydia Bean, Cultural Mechanisms and Killing 
Fields, in THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME 8, 11 (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006) 
(discussing “resilient” invariance findings related to “factors representing disadvantage, 
e.g., differing combinations of poverty, income, family disruption, joblessness, and 
unemployment”) with Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Structural 
Disadvantage and Crime: White, Black, and Hispanic Comparisons, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 799, 
800 (2012) (“[T]he degree to which differences across groups in structural disadvantage 
predict racial or ethnic differences in violence is far from settled.”). 
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can actually think about them.”93 He sets aside the “thorny, and perhaps 
insoluble,” challenge of justifying what is included or excluded during that 
process of simplification.94 He also describes social constructs such as race 
and gender as “cognitively immutable,” that is, as factors that are difficult 
to set aside for people who “possess the attribute[s].”95 Adler sees that 
cognitive immutability problematizes the conditions of full information and 
rationality necessary for the ranking of life-histories and utility sets.96 He 
“very much hope[s]” that the fully informed, rational evaluators would not 
be influenced by socially-constructed status identifiers in the evaluative 
process.97 Realizing this hope may prove elusive.98 
These and other challenging aspects of Adler’s analysis await more 
comprehensive critical analysis. My goals here are simply to sketch key 
aspects of his argument for a continuous prioritarian decision-making 
model, to note some areas for future refinement and development of the 
argument, and to take some initial steps toward testing the argument’s 
application in the real-world context of the struggle for improved public 
defense services.  
It is to the latter task that this essay now turns. As discussed in Part IV, 
the indigent criminal defendant’s right to appointed counsel is embedded in 
a complex socioeconomic setting. It is a context in which both well-being 
and fair distribution are perpetually contested and at risk. Exploring the 
development of right-to-counsel doctrine as a real-world instantiation of 
Adler’s theory may help to counter arguments that would classify Well-
 
93 ADLER, supra note 6, at 246. 
94 Id. at 246, 258. 
95 Id. at 274. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 274–75. 
98  See Moore, Democracy Enhancement, supra note 18. 
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Being and Fair Distribution with The Sound and the Fury—as a “splendid 
failure.”99 
IV. WELL-BEING, FAIR DISTRIBUTION, AND THE RIGHT TO 
APPOINTED COUNSEL 
 Despite the questions and challenges facing Adler’s innovative 
arguments for a continuous prioritarian decision-making procedure, his 
focus on inequality-averse improvements in well-being for the less well-off 
warrants further investigation for academicians and activists interested in 
reforming criminal justice systems generally and public defense systems in 
particular. This Part begins that investigation. Part IV.A interrogates the 
seminal cases in the development of right-to-counsel doctrine, and identifies 
a decision-making process similar to Adler’s at work. Part IV.B summarizes 
the practical failures of right-to-counsel doctrine, and calls for modification 
of Adler’s approach to improve the applicability of the continuous 
prioritarian social welfare model in the real-world context of justice reform.  
A. Powell and Prioritarianism 
An exemplar of prioritarian social welfare decision-making may lie in the 
tangled roots of the indigent criminal defendant’s federal constitutional 
right to appointed counsel. This distinctive constitutional positive right 
mandates redistribution of resources to those who by definition occupy 
lower rungs on the ladder of socioeconomic well-being.100 And the doctrinal 
history reveals an ongoing struggle toward consensus on the right’s 
justification and scope. 
 
99 Compare Sagoff, supra note 33, and Hausman, supra note 33, with Kathleen Hulley, 
The Most Splendid Failure: Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, 8 REVUE FRANÇAISE 
D’ÉTUDES AMÉRICAINES 260 (1979) (book review). 
100 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
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The complex and sometimes overlapping sources of the right to 
appointed counsel include the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,101 as well as the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of “Assistance of Counsel” for federal defendants102 and the incorporation 
of that federal right via the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the 
states.103 Albeit in a herky-jerk trajectory, the right to appointed counsel has 
steadily expanded in scope from its original application as a due process 
corrective in Powell v. Alabama.104 
As has been discussed in detail elsewhere,105 the truncated capital 
proceedings in Powell arose squarely at the intersection of crime, race, and 
poverty. The defendants were young African American men accused of 
raping two white women.106 They were tried under circumstances just shy 
of a courthouse lynching,107 or, in the words of the Powell majority, 
“judicial murder.”108 
 
101 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 35658 (1963) (establishing due process and 
equal protection rights to appointed appellate counsel in jurisdictions providing direct 
appeal as of right); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (establishing due process 
right to timely appointment of counsel for capital trials). 
102 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 46768 (1938). 
103 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (requiring appointed counsel for 
indigent defendants facing felony charges); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 
(1972) (requiring appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing misdemeanor 
charges). 
104 Powell, 287 U.S. at 6465. 
105 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts 
“Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1 (Carol B. Steiker ed., 2006). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. The young men “ranged in age from 13 to 20.” Id. Their names were Ozie Powell, 
Willie Roberson, Andy Wright, Olen Montgomery, Haywood Patterson, Charles Weems, 
Clarence Norris, Roy Wright, and Eugene Williams. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park 
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1315, 1320, 1334 (2004) (discussing the deeply imbedded myth in American culture that 
black men are “animalistic, sexually unrestrained, inherently criminal, and ultimately 
bent on rape”). 
108 Powell, 287 U.S. at 72. 
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Powell was a watershed case. For the first time the Court held that, even 
without an express request for counsel, the lack of lawyering in the “critical 
period” of pretrial client consultation and fact investigation violated due 
process—at least where the defendants were young, illiterate, far from 
home, and on trial for their lives.109 “No attempt was made to investigate. 
No opportunity to do so was given.”110 The cases went forward “with the 
haste of the mob.”111 The defendants had no meaningful right to be heard.112 
In such circumstances, the right to timely appointment of counsel was 
held to be fundamental—a prerequisite for preserving the “liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”113 The 
Court justified this newly articulated due process guarantee with what has 
become a time-tested methodology: listening to the choir. The Court 
assessed the degree to which consensus had developed on this issue as 
evidenced in state constitutions, legislative enactments, and case law.114 
Although the analogy may be problematized—a task not taken up here—
the Court’s methodology has affinities with the process of reflective 
equilibrium that is essential to Adler’s prioritarian social welfare economic 
theory. As a reminder, reflective equilibrium is the reasoning process 
through which premises are confirmed or modified when tested against 
competing views and real-world facts.115 The Powell Court used a similar 
approach in assessing the state of convergent, cross-jurisdictional 
preferences on the question of the right to appointed counsel. 
 
109 Id. at 5758, 71. 
110 Id. at 58. 
111 Id. But see id. at 7576 (Butler and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting) (discussing pretrial 
motions and trial tactics undertaken by defense attorneys, including cross-examination of 
complaining witnesses). 
112 Id. at 67 (majority opinion). 
113 Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
114 Id. at 7273. 
115 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.  
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The Court surveyed the jurisdictional landscape over time and space and 
found that by 1932, when the Court ruled on the due process issue, the 
federal government and the states uniformly mandated judicial appointment 
of counsel for indigent capital defendants.116 The Court also discovered that 
the majority of states required appointment of counsel for any defendant 
facing any criminal charge for which he could not afford to hire a defense 
attorney.117 Probing more deeply beneath these converging mandates, the 
Court also detected an underlying “immutable principle” binding fairness to 
equality.118 That principle was rooted in a type of inequality aversion 
consistent with Adler’s version of a social welfare decision-making process. 
Here, the target was reduction of disparities in knowledge, power, and skill 
that exist between an individual criminal defendant and a prosecuting 
authority.119 
On that point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had issued a hearty national 
back-patting as early as 1910. In Hack v. State, that Court described a 
playing field that had been at least leveled for indigent defendants, if not 
affirmatively tipped in their favor: 
Thanks to the humane policy of the modern criminal law . . . if [a 
defendant] be poor, he may have counsel furnished him by the 
state . . . ; not infrequently he is thus furnished counsel more able 
than the attorney for the state.120 
The Powell majority was less overtly sanguine about the quality of 
representation provided to indigent criminal defendants. The Court 
nevertheless read the available empirical data in a similar spirit. Like the 
court in Hack, the majority Justices in Powell invoked American colonial 
 
116 Powell, 287 U.S. at 73. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 7273. 
119 See id. 
120 Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910). 
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rebellion against the English common-law notion that defense attorneys 
were unnecessary in felony cases because trial judges would protect 
defendants’ interests.121  
Until 1836, English law allowed civil litigants and misdemeanor-level 
criminal defendants to hire counsel if they could afford to do so. In contrast, 
defendants facing felony charges—and therefore a possible death 
sentence—could hire counsel only to address questions of law.122 This odd 
arrangement was anathema to many. As one American colonial critic noted, 
“It is manifest that there is as much necessity for counsel to investigate 
matters of fact, as points of law, if truth is to be discovered.”123 The Powell 
opinion echoed that refrain. The Court repeatedly emphasized the critical 
duties of pretrial client consultation and fact investigation as unique to the 
defense function.124 
The Court’s focus here was not merely on counsel’s utility in terms of 
equality enhancement and procedural fairness. Powell also championed the 
intimate relationship between the individual defendant and the advocate 
dedicated to advancing his interests. Trial judges, the Court noted, 
cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or 
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and 
accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the 
confessional.125 
The Court struck a similarly elegiac tone in Avery v. Alabama. While 
rejecting the defendant’s right-to-counsel claim under Powell, the Avery 
 
121 Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (citing 1 COOLEY’S CONST. LIM. 8th ed., 698, et seq., and 
notes); cf. Hack, 124 N.W. at 494. 
122 Powell, 287 U.S. at 61. 
123 Id. at 63 n.1. 
124 Id. at 63. 
125 Id. at 61. 
1056 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
THIRD ANNUAL PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFERENCE 
Court nevertheless ascribed a “peculiar sacredness”126 to the constitutional 
guarantee at issue. Such sonorous language may have derived in part from 
the Powell Court’s express reliance upon existing state constitutional, 
statutory, and judicial mandates for appointing counsel.127 At a deeper level, 
the language may derive from a radical commitment, too often honored in 
the breach, to the same confluence of fairness and equality toward which 
Adler’s theory aims. 
The Court’s invocation of state consensus on the right to appointed 
counsel did not end with Powell and Avery.128  In Gideon v. Wainwright, the 
Court applied similar reasoning in holding that the Sixth Amendment, as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, mandated appointment of 
counsel in state felony cases.129  Gideon is viewed with Powell as a 
watershed case and has far overshadowed Douglas v. California,130 decided 
the same day. 
Douglas arose when two codefendants were convicted of thirteen serious 
felonies. The defendants were tried together after their motions to continue 
and to obtain separate, conflict-free counsel were denied.131 Applying a 
state rule of criminal procedure, the intermediate appellate court rejected the 
 
126 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 
370, 37475 (1892)).  
127 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 7273. 
128 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 46263, 46768 (1938) (quoting Powell and 
Hack with approval; holding that, absent a knowing and voluntary waiver, the failure to 
appoint counsel for indigent federal defendants violates the Sixth Amendment and divests 
the trial court of jurisdiction). But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465, 47273 (1942) 
(rejecting claim that Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment by guaranteeing a fundamental right to appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants facing state felony charges; finding such diverse state approaches that federal 
constitution should not “straitjacket[]”). 
129 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). See also David Cole, Gideon v. 
Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 101, 10102 (Carol B. Steiker ed., 2006) (discussing the history of Gideon). 
130 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
131 Id. at 35354. 
G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright  1057 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013 
defendants’ request for appointed counsel to handle their appeals.132 That 
court affirmed the convictions, and the state Supreme Court denied petitions 
for review.133 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
constitutionality of the procedural rule allowing appellate courts to deny 
requests for appointed counsel based on judicial review of the record and a 
conclusion that appointed counsel would yield no “advantage” to 
defendants or the courts.134 
The Douglas Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment required appointment of counsel on direct 
appeal in states that offer direct appeal as of right.135 Examining the 
decision in light of Adler’s social welfare decision-making procedure 
reveals that the majority expressly championed the conjunction of 
inequality-aversion and fairness. The targeted “evil” was “discrimination 
against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an 
appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’”136 To force 
indigents through “a gantlet” that the rich could evade “did not comport 
with fair procedure.”137 
Although the analysis here barely skims the doctrinal surface, it appears 
that in these early right-to-counsel cases inequality aversion targeted the 
incommensurate power, position, and resources of an individual vis-à-vis 
the concentrated legal authority of government to charge, prosecute, 
convict, and strip away liberty or life. Methodologically, the Court was no 
diva dominating the stage. Instead, a harmonizing federal top-note joined 
the states’ majoritarian chorus. Further investigation and analysis should 
continue testing the hypothesis that early right-to-counsel jurisprudence 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 354. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 35556. 
136 Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)). 
137 Id. at 357. 
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may be an object lesson in the identification and vindication of convergent 
preferences that prioritize the interests of the less well-off. 
B. Expansion, Weak Enforceability, and Triage 
The foregoing analysis applies Adler’s methodology to identify 
inequality-averse convergent interests at work in the development of 
constitutional right-to-counsel doctrine. But that doctrinal development has 
also incited a fair amount of discord. One dissenting Justice in Douglas 
decried the majority’s mandate for appointment of appellate counsel as 
“utter extravagance and a waste of the State’s funds . . . an intolerable 
burden on the State’s judicial machinery.”138  
Argersinger v. Hamlin, which extended Gideon to misdemeanor cases,139 
contained a more detailed fiscal note.140 Concurring in the judgment, 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist advocated a flexible due process approach 
instead of a bright-line Sixth Amendment mandate for appointment of 
counsel in misdemeanor cases.141 They warned that “hundreds of 
communities in the United States with no or very few lawyers [and] with 
meager financial resources” would be unable to fulfill their Sixth 
Amendment duties.142 
Such worries were well-founded. They have been voiced repeatedly and 
with increasing urgency as the right to appointed counsel has expanded 
 
138 Id. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
139 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 
654, 658, 674 (2002) (extending Argersinger to probation cases with potential for 
incarceration). See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 31012 
(2011) (describing varying levels of compliance with duty to appoint misdemeanor 
counsel). 
140 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 4661 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
141 Id. at 6061. 
142 Id. 
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substantively and across procedural phases of case development.143 Today, 
the right comprises juvenile as well as adult representation144 and includes 
the critical periods of pretrial investigation and communication, 
arraignment, trial, and direct appeal. The right also touches upon additional 
pretrial settings,145 including plea-bargaining,146 sentencing,147 first-tier 
petitions for discretionary appellate review,148 state post-conviction 
proceedings,149 and advice on the collateral consequence of deportation that 
attaches to any potential plea agreement.150 
Yet, in a pattern typical of other constitutional criminal procedure 
guarantees,151 a substantively meaningful right to appointed counsel has 
been only weakly enforceable since Strickland v. Washington established an 
ex post performance-and-prejudice standard for evaluating counsel’s 
constitutional effectiveness.152  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
 
143 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
144 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (imposing due process duty to appoint counsel 
for indigent juveniles facing delinquency proceedings that could result in loss of liberty). 
145 See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008). 
146 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 139091 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. 
Ct. 1399, 141011 (2012). 
147 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 39099 (2000) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
148 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 61011 (2005) (applying Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), to require appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced 
defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review). 
149 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320–21 (2012) (finding ineffective assistance 
of counsel on first-tier collateral review may establish cause to overcome procedural 
default defense to federal habeas claim); see also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 
(2012) (applying holding in Martinez where post-conviction counsel abandoned client 
without notice). 
150 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (holding that constitutionally 
effective assistance requires advising defendants on collateral consequence of deportation 
related to plea offer). 
151 See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and 
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1341–46 (2012) (discussing weak enforceability of 
prosecutors’ due process duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
152 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
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Penalty Act further undercut enforceability by restricting federal habeas 
access, slamming a crucial procedural door to many ineffective assistance 
claims.153 
An abundant literature documents the resulting regulatory shortcomings 
and their contribution to crises in the underfunding and overloading of 
indigent defense service systems across the country.154 That analysis will 
not be repeated here. It suffices to say that Strickland’s bar for 
constitutionally effective assistance is so low that lawyers have hurdled it 
while habitually drunk,155 while sleeping during trial,156 and (despite being 
awake and presumably sober) while failing to investigate and present 
readily available evidence of actual innocence in a capital murder case.157 
 
153 See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of 
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 
44456 (2011) (contesting evidence and argument for eliminating habeas access for most 
prisoners in Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 81833 (2009)); Justin F. Marceau, 
Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 85, 
13346 (2012) (same). By requiring appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced 
defendants seeking discretionary review, and by softening procedural default rules that 
might otherwise foreclose federal habeas relief due to failures of state post-conviction 
counsel, the Court is holding states accountable for failing to provide effective counsel to 
litigate ineffective assistance claims against trial and appellate lawyers. See Halbert, 545 
U.S. at 61011; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 132021. The Court appears to be pushing more 
responsibility onto the states to improve representation, or at least to ensure that 
ineffective assistance claims can be fully litigated in state court. Halbert also hints at 
some resurgence of the inequality-aversion principle that animated Douglas v. California. 
See Halbert, 545 U.S. at 61011. 
154 For examples, see supra note 4. 
155 Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001) 
(affirming death sentence despite feeling “troubled” at capital defense attorney’s admitted 
“decades-long habit” of drinking “twelve ounces of rum” each night during trial); see 
also Ronald R. Tabak, Why An Independent Appointing Authority is Necessary to Choose 
Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 
111213 (2003). 
156 See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 62325 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1575 (2012) (discussing “sleeping lawyer” jurisprudence). 
157 See Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. Supp. 2d 706, 72830 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per 
curiam, 467 Fed. Appx. 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding 
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 Such doctrinal and empirical data lead to a depressed and depressing 
view of indigent defense systems. Without succumbing to the general 
malaise, leading criminal justice scholar Ronald Wright summarized the 
grim state of affairs: “Year after year, in study after study, observers find 
remarkably poor defense lawyering . . . and they point to lack of funding as 
the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.”158 
Some commentators, viewing Gideon’s promise as broken and without 
meaningful hope of repair, champion triaged public defense services. They 
urge investment of resources where, in their view, those investments will 
yield the biggest bang for the buck: death penalty cases, felonies, and cases 
involving a viable claim of actual innocence.159 Former prisoner and 
longtime justice activist Susan Burton suggests a very different tactic. She 
proposes that defendants and defenders change the broken system by 
crashing it.160 Burton sees no other avenue toward productive change than 
 
trial counsel ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying defendant new trial due to 
lack of prejudice). The author represented Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal 
appellate and post-conviction challenges to his convictions and death sentence. Id. at 708. 
158 Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (2004). Wright proposes advocacy of parity 
between prosecutorial and defense functions as an effective strategy for reform. Id. at 
253–62. 
159 But see Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for 
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 
931, 95973 (2010) (critiquing proposals for triaging or reassigning defense services 
proposed in, for example, Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise 
of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) and Darryl 
K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional 
Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 816–25 (2004)); see also Benjamin H. Barton & 
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 967, 990–95 (2012) (arguing for triage in counsel appointments). 
160 Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-
system.html?_r=0. 
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the collective monkeywrenching of the machinery through refusal of plea 
offers and insistence on taking cases to trial.161 
Both suggestions are subject to criticism. With respect to the triage 
approach, it is well settled that a governmental threat to individual liberty 
through criminal prosecution triggers the leveling counterweight of 
appointed counsel for indigent defendants.162 Triage proponents tack too far 
toward the utilitarian in their willingness to sacrifice the individual to the 
aggregate good. Susan Burton acknowledges similar objections to her 
proposal that defendants crash criminal justice systems through collective 
insistence on the right to trial.163 
Another avenue—and one perhaps consistent with Professor Adler’s 
continuous prioritarian moral decision-making procedure—is to examine 
closely those centers of indigent defense that strive for excellence, seeking 
to understand why they work as well as they do despite many reasons to 
expect failure.164 Particular scrutiny is warranted where community defense 
 
161 Id. 
162 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (requiring appointed 
counsel for indigent defendants facing felony charges); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) 
(imposing due process duty to appoint counsel for indigent juveniles facing delinquency 
proceedings that could result in loss of liberty); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 
(1972) (extending Gideon to misdemeanor cases involving the risk of incarceration). 
163 See Alexander, supra note 160. A softer approach involves litigation aimed at court-
ordered increases in funding or reductions in defender caseloads. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 
621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). On the limited effect of Peart-style actions, see Note: 
Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense 
Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 17421745 (2005). But see Cara H. Drinan, The Third 
Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 458–
75 (2009) (outlining effective strategies for repairing the right to client counsel). 
164 See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer 
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 
179, 182–83 (2012) (discussing superior outcomes in Philadelphia murder cases 
involving public defense attorneys over members of the private bar); Jonathan A. 
Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform 
Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 21318 (2008) (discussing leadership 
development as an effective strategy for reform); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Taking it to the 
Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 16566, 165–66 & n.51 (2004) 
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or similar collaborative efforts address root causes of crime and 
punishment.165 Such efforts include the promotion of early intervention 
programs with pregnant women and young children; increased access to 
quality education, stable employment, safe housing, and drug and mental 
health treatment; and the transportation services necessary to access these 
resources.166 
Not coincidentally, such systemic reforms can help cure the democracy 
deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty by strengthening 
capacities to criticize existing norms and structures, to organize across lines 
of race and class, and to advocate successfully for meaningful change.167 In 
working toward that goal, scholars and activists who seek to identify and 
promote sustainable conditions for grounding an effective oppositional 
politics in the context of criminal justice reform and, more specifically, 
public defense reform may find a helpful resource in Professor Adler’s 
pioneering work. His unique incorporation of inequality aversion and 
fairness as pivotal analytical tools may prove to be an important 
contribution to the reframing of theoretical and practical arguments for 
reform. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Well-Being and Fair Distribution is a closely-reasoned and provocative 
contribution to the literature at the highly contested intersection of law, 
moral philosophy, and economic theory. Professor Adler’s rich 
 
(discussing “stellar” reputations of some defender offices; citing Cait Clarke, Problem-
Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional 
Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401, 44854 
(2001)). 
165Taylor-Thompson, supra note 164, at 18094 (describing Seattle Defender 
Association’s Racial Disparity Project). 
166See, e.g., Moore, Democracy Enhancement, supra note 18 (discussing effectiveness of 
early intervention and other prevention strategies). 
167See id. 
1064 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
THIRD ANNUAL PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFERENCE 
interdisciplinary discussion is an intriguing new resource for academicians 
and activists working at another intersection—the distinctively intransigent 
national intersection of crime, race, and poverty. For fifty years, Gideon v. 
Wainwright has stood as a constitutional marker at that intersection. 
But as a banner for change, Gideon has wavered more than waved. The 
arrested development of the right to appointed counsel bespeaks a 
complicated doctrinal history and an ongoing struggle over fairness and 
equality—a struggle akin to the reflective equilibrium process that is 
integral to Adler’s continuous prioritarian social welfare function. Further 
research should more thoroughly probe this connection, including the 
possibility that recent Supreme Court decisions such as Halbert v. 
Michigan168 auger a resurgent inequality-averse doctrine grounded in the 
due process-equal protection line of right-to-counsel cases.169 
As the struggle for quality public defense services continues, Adler’s 
novel approach to justice issues could become a powerful influence, 
particularly if his methodology is adapted to prioritize democracy 
enhancement. Such a focus could help shift grasstop reform—that is, efforts 
driven by elites on behalf of the less well-off—toward grassroots change 
that empowers low income people and people of color to participate more 
directly in the formation, implementation, and oversight of the criminal 
justice policies in which indigent defense services play such a critical role. 
 
 
168545 U.S. 605, 61011 (2005) (requiring appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced 
defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review). 
169Id.; see also supra note 153 (discussing equal protection analysis in Halbert); cf. 
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1220-32 (2013) (arguing for equal protection-fundamental rights 
strategy for public defense reform). 
